"established," and where and how to demarcate the lines between religion and politics, are ultimately questions for the state to decide. This is the defining feature, indeed essential paradox, of modern secularism. 5 The second is that, while there may be no necessary correlation between establishment and the right to religious freedom, where the right is recognized by the State, its meaning and scope will be dynamically interrelated with the nature of the public sphere in a particular society. This last point is a source of great confusion today. Contemporary religious freedom discourse is shaped by two interrelated features: first, a conception of political authority not in terms of any formal relation between the state and religion(s), but in terms of secular neutrality, and second, a conception of the right in terms of freedom. The discourse is able to maintain its simultaneous, and ultimately paradoxical, claims to uniqueness (because neutral towards religion) and universality (because securing the right to freedom of religion) by defining each concept in terms of the other. The constantly oscillating dialectic between neutrality and freedom ensures that the nature of the public sphere is dynamically related to the scope of the right to religious freedom. 6 What this conceptual structure means is that the political nature of the public sphere (i.e.
the relation of actually existing religions and religious communities to the state) is in practice understood and configured in terms of a moral theory of individual rights (i.e. the relation of rights-bearers as legal subjects to the State). Conversely, the actual meaning accorded to the right to religious liberty in any particular case or controversy is in practice understood and ineliminably contextual and interconnected. Any account of nomian neutrality will quickly devolve into hypostasis or reification of an historically specific political order and thus a particular definition of "religion and belief" and specific form of demarcation between "public and private" spheres. Any account of the right, when viewed historically, will reveal that rival intellectual traditions and normative dissonances and conflicts are internal to the right itself. The right, in other words, is simultaneously historically relative and normatively plural.
The thesis of this chapter is that the category of "religious establishment" has been gradually transformed in modern liberal secular discourse into the category of moral right-the right to religious liberty. What today is viewed as "established" is not actually existing, politically negotiated relations between the State and particular religious communities or institutions (e.g. "the church,"), but rather the legal category of "right." Legal and religious obligations are re-described as rights of the subject in order to protect a normative conception of freedom. As legal subjects religious individuals and groups thus assert claims of right which the state must then decide through legislation or adjudication to recognize or restrict. This makes contestation over rights claims an increasingly political process and further increases the power of the state.
Two key issues remain: first, who is the proper subject of the right? Are only individual persons, or may religious groups, communities, and institutions also properly be regarded as After a brief overview of the history of Muslim communities in South Africa and the reasons for the non-recognition of Muslim marriages, I describe the efforts undertaken by the SALRC to prepare a draft bill recognizing Muslim marriages as a matter of state law and the politics which has subsequently emerged around competing claims to and understandings of recognition of Muslim personal law (MPL), and I offer reflections on the reasons for and implications of these antinomies and divergences. The law reform efforts in South Africa have exposed critical ambivalences and normative resistance to the two great transformations which together define the modern politics of religious freedom: the first relating to the emergence of a "secular" public realm imagined to be independent of and in some new relation to "religion,"
now viewed as solely a matter for private life (the so-called public/private divide), and the second relating to the redefinition of religion itself as conscience or belief in an age of what we might term secular equality where the unstable convergence between conscience and autonomy has gradually reversed in the secular imaginary such that religious liberty is today viewed as autonomy.
History of Muslim Communities in South Africa
There have been Muslim communities in southern Africa for more than 300 years.
7
The heterogeneity of these groups is a product of the history of settlement and colonialism in southern
Africa from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century. The political questions of non-interference in or recognition by the State of religious norms and practices are ultimately held to be subject to the normative (moral) constraints of the right. At the same time, the subject and scope of the right are each ambiguous, allowing space for forms of (political) contestation and recognition of religious norms, identities, and practices.
The question then becomes how these obvious antinomies and contradictions on issues of legal establishment, freedom and pluralism, and individual and group rights and identities are to be navigated and, if only provisionally, resolved.
The Recognition of Muslim Marriages Bill
In July 2003 the SALRC released its report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters, including a draft of the Muslim Marriages Bill. The basic structure and purpose of the Bill was to make provision for the recognition of existing Muslim marriages (whether monogamous or polygynous) as well as existing civil marriages to a second wife.
23
The Bill specifies the requirements of a valid Muslim marriage and provides for registration of such marriages. 24 It further specifies that the proprietary consequences of Muslim marriages will be automatically out of community of property, unless the parties agree otherwise by registered antenuptial 23. Section 5 (Requirements for validity).
24. Section 6 (Registration).
agreement. 25 In relation to termination of Muslim marriages, the Bill specifies that this can be by faskh (dissolution by a court on the application of the wife), talaq (right of the husband to terminate), or khula (dissolution at the instance of the wife), but the consequences of such termination have to be confirmed by a court. 26 The Bill also contains further provisions dealing with custody and maintenance.
27
It is interesting to note that the Bill does not provide for independent shari'a courts, but rather seeks to implement Muslim Personal Law in the existing court system with the requirement that a Muslim judge or advocate and two Muslim assessors be appointed to assist the court. 28 Court decisions are then subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal with the proviso that decisions are submitted to two accredited Muslim institutions for written comment on questions of law only.
29
Waheeda Amien has described the two main benefits of the Bill as allowing Muslim parties to enjoy similar civil benefits as afforded to legal spouses while also allowing women to enjoy the positive benefits of a Muslim marriage. This includes the provisions which (1) oblige parties to provide for mahr; (2) recognize the husband's unilateral obligation to maintain his children and wife during the marriage and iddah; (3) oblige the husband in cases of divorce to provide a separate residence for the wife when she has custody of the children; (4) entitle the wife to be separately remunerated for breast-feeding purposes for two years from the birth of the child; (5) enable the court to make an equitable division of assets where a party has assisted in the family business or contributed to the estate; (6) enable a surviving spouse to lodge a claim against her deceased husband's estate for unpaid mahr and any contribution recognized by shari'a that she makes to his estate; (7) provide a minimum marriageable age of 18 years applicable to both parties; (8) recognize different forms of divorce available to women such as faskh, khula, and talaq, rather than simply talaq as the exclusive domain of the husband; and (9) recognize polygyny, but only in a limited form regulated to protect the interests of women.
30
The negative aspects of the Bill from Amien's perspective include (1) the traditional Muslim approach to matrimonial property in the form of an out of community of property regime (although with an opt-out provision); (2) the fact that husband and wife are equal in human dignity, status, and capacity, but are not equal in rights (e.g. the husband only is allowed to take multiple wives and the wife is under a unilateral obligation to observe iddah); (3) the exclusive right of men to unilaterally repudiate the marriage (talaq); and (4) the placing of interpretation and implementation of these provisions in the hands of Muslim judges and assessors required to have "specialized knowledge of Islamic law" which makes the Bill susceptible to conservative interpretations of shari'a.
31
In order to see what is at stake in these competing positions, let us turn to consider the politics surrounding these issues which has evolved during the law reform process.
The Politics of Religious Establishment
As early as 1975, efforts were made to begin recognizing certain aspects of the legal consequences of Muslim marriages in South African law. The main supporters of these early initiatives were the established ulama groups. Others opposed these efforts as they suspected they "had more to do with the attempt to purchase legitimacy for the disgraced tricameral and a proper religious subjectivity 38 and at the same time empowers the State to intervene more aggressively for regulatory purposes in any communal, traditional, customary, or religious spheres of life currently under non-state forms of authority. Indeed, the very purpose and rationality of such regulation is to "liberate" individuals from oppression or backwardness of traditional forms of authority. On this view it would be preferable for Muslim personal law ultimately to wither way as an anachronism or greatly be reduced in its scope and social power by being replaced with a system of uniform civil law.
39
We see a mirror opposite in the camps supporting the Bill. Like the traditional ulama bodies, political, liberal, and secular Muslim groups argue for a broad collective right to religious freedom, but not for the purposes of non-interference. What they seek is public recognition. The public sphere should be open to and engage with different collective religious identities and norms, but should be subject to the overriding secular discipline and normative constraints of the 38. Saba Mahmood notes that "contrary to the ideological self-understanding of secularism (as the doctrinal separation of religion and state), secularism has historically entailed the regulation and reformation of religious beliefs, doctrines, and practices to yield a particular normative conception of religion (that is largely Protestant Christian in its contours) and that "[h]istorically speaking, the secular state has not simply cordoned off religion from its regulatory ambitions but sought to remake it through the agency of the law. What makes consideration of these issues so difficult and divisive is that these four positions are often run seamlessly together, confused by proponents and opponents alike, or are 
Shari'a as Muslim personal law in the Spaces of Modern Secular Power
A second striking feature of the 2003 Bill is Section 15, which provides for disputes relating to "the interpretation or application of any provision" to be referred to a court for adjudication, but on the proviso that a "Muslim judge from that court" or, in the alternative, a senior "Muslim advocate or attorney," is appointed to hear the dispute at first instance. 44 The court is then to be "assisted by two Muslim assessors who shall have specialized knowledge of Islamic law." 45 Any decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, but the decision must also be submitted to two accredited Muslim institutions "for written comment on questions of law only,"
which must be lodged within 60 days with the Registrar of the appeal court. marriage in Islamic law by providing that, unless an ante-nuptial contract is entered into by the spouses and registered, a "Muslim marriage to which this Act applies shall be deemed to be a marriage out of community of property, excluding the accrual system." 54 This differs from the civil law position where the default rule is "in community of property."
55
The Bill further specifies that in registering a Muslim marriage the marriage officer must record "the dower agreed to." 56 The term "dower" or "mahr" is then defined as "the money, property or anything of value, including benefits which must be payable by the husband to the wife as an ex lege consequence of the marriage itself in order to establish a family and lay the foundations for affection and companionship."
57
These provisions have attracted criticism for codifying discriminatory differences between men and women: the husband only is required to pay the mahr and to maintain his wife both during and after the marriage; upon the dissolution of marriage, the wife has property rights only out of community of property (without accrual), and her right to maintenance is only for the period of iddah (three months). Such differences are argued to violate the right to equality, and gender rights advocates have thus viewed this form of legal recognition of Muslim personal law a priori as a threat to women's rights.
While space precludes detailed consideration of these questions, there are a number of reasons why such critiques rest on often problematic assumptions that serve to exacerbate rather 54. Section 8(1). Thus the spouses maintain their own estate, and any growth accrued during the marriage is not divided between them. This is subject to Section 9(7)(b), which allows the court to make an order for the equitable division of assets where a party has assisted in the operation of the family business or contributed to the maintenance or increase of the other's estate.
55. Marriage Act 25 of 1961.
56. Section 6(3)(c).
57. Section 1(vi). In relation to maintenance, the "husband is obliged to maintain his wife during the subsistence of a Muslim marriage according to his means and her reasonable needs." In the case of dissolution or divorce, "the husband is obliged to maintain the wife for the mandatory waiting period of 'Iddah' and, if she has custody of minor children, "to remunerate the wife, including providing a separate residence if the wife does not own a residence, for the period of such custody only." Section 12(2)(c)(i) and (ii). Once this historical genealogy is recognized, the notion that complete secularization of religionbased systems of family law will lead to increased gender equality becomes inherently problematic. Indeed, as the family has become "a key site of intervention for projects of social reform undertaken by the state" in the modern period, this has in many cases served to increase 58. Mahmood, 57.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 58.
61. Ibid. gender inequality, especially in relation to the institution of marriage. 62 Viewing family law and the institution of marriage as sites of inequality and exceptionalism 63 can help us to see the extent to which the existing system of family law in South
Africa is deeply entangled with Protestant genealogies and understandings of the family. 64 The extent to which marriage as an institution remains an established status that is implicated in the functions of both social order and personal freedom generating its own inherent inequalities will further be apparent. 65 Following Janet Halley this would suggest that we should pay more careful attention to the marriage system as a whole-including its various "drop-off" and "formpluralism" elements-and the complex ways in which it paradoxically intertwines both status and contract. 66 This would allow us critically to examine the multifaceted, exclusionary, and unequal effects of the South African marriage system which now includes civil, common law, customary, same-sex, domestic partnership, Muslim, and (currently under consideration) Hindu marriages.
Conclusion
The chapter has argued that the law reform effort to recognize Muslim marriages and Muslim personal law more broadly in South Africa allows us to locate these dilemmas within the problematic space of modern secular power and the various anxieties and contingencies this gives rise to regarding the limits of liberal neutrality and liberal rights. In this respect South Africa's response to the claims of its Muslim communities sheds light on the two main dilemmas haunting modern liberal accounts of the right to religious freedom. The first concerns the neutrality of the public sphere and the insistence that religion is properly a matter for private life, where religious faith, identity, and ritual are to be simultaneously contained and protected and excluded from public life where rational secular discourse is similarly to be construed and secured. The second concerns the universality of the right to religious freedom and its justification in liberal political morality in terms of competing accounts of autonomy.
The South African case has been shown to complicate these narratives. It allows us to see that the neutrality of the political order is always an abstract particularism comprising contingent settlements and negotiated religion-state establishments. It further allows us to see how the existing contours of the public sphere reflect the "private faith" of communities which have historically embodied the Christian and European traditions of South Africa's colonial past. If correct, the challenge is not further to exclude the claims of religious communities, but to ensure that the public sphere reflects and recognizes the diversity of South Africa's actually existing religious communities.
The South African case also allows us to see that the universality of the right to religious freedom is always a concrete universal claiming normative authority. A value pluralist, groupdifferentiated account of freedom of religion or belief requires the state to recognize a limited sphere of collective autonomy or nomian separation-a space for "associational self-realization in nomian terms." Such a Coverian view of normative and legal pluralism challenges the state's domination of autonomous communities under a unitary law and seeks for the polynomia of legal meaning to be extended to the domain of social practice and control. Thus rather than circumscribing the nomos in a single, statist "Spartan eunomia," it invites in new worlds in the form of a complex nomos of "equally dignified communal bases of legal meaning that constitute the array of commitments, realities, and visions extant at any given time." 67 The old adage of "one law for all and no exceptions" on this view gives way to "plural laws for different communities with certain exceptions."
67. Robert Cover, "Nomos and Narrative," 57.
